R epresentations of interdependent relationships such as negotiations may differ along several interrelated dimensions. Such variations reflect differences in individual preferences for outcomes and strategies, their expectations about the behavior of others, and beliefs about the nature of the underlying relationship (Deutsch, 1982; Pinkley, 1990; Putnam & Holmer, 1992) . In the context of negotiations, these differences are reflected in the distinction between two styles of bargaining: integrative and distributive. Whereas integrative bargaining is linked to a problem-solving orientation in which trust, affinity, and joint gain are emphasized, distributive bargaining is linked to a competitive orientation in which power, control, and individual gain are emphasized (e.g., Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Carroll & Payne, 1991; Deutsch, 1982; Larrick & Blount, 1995; Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Putnam, 1990) Moreover, these goal differences are linked to the differential use of negotiating strategies. Relative to negotiators who aim to maximize individual gain, those concerned with maximizing joint gain more frequently exchange information and are more systematic in their concession making, they are more likely to foster a joint relationship and to suggest a problem-solving approach, and they are less likely to make concessions, positional commitments, and threats (Carnevale & Lawler, 1987; Lewis & Fry, 1977; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Schulz & Pruitt, 1978) .
Although individual differences are influential in the construction of social relationships, including negotiations (Greenhalgh & Gilkey, 1993; Rubin & Brown, 1975) , relatively little importance has been placed on their role in shaping the negotiation process (Thompson, 1990) . In this research, we argue that individual differences have the potential to shape the negotiating process. We develop this argument by considering the role of social value orientations in the selection and sequencing of negotiation strategies. Like several other classificatory schemes (e.g., Fiske, 1992; Triandis, 1995) , social value orientations describe individual differences in outcome preferences in interdependent settings (Deutsch, 1982; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988) . From these schemes it is possible to identify strong parallels between individual differences in the interpretation of interdependence and differ-Authors' Note: This research was supported by funding from an Economics and Commerce Faculty Research Grant and Australian Research Council Grant. An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Association of Conflict Management Conference in Bonn, Germany. We thank Carsten De Dreu and Michael Platow for their comments and Sue Olaman, Cindy Shum, and Therese Calegari for their assistance in transcribing and coding the videotapes of negotiations. Correspondence should be addressed to Mara Olekalns, Deences in negotiating styles: To the extent that individuals differ in their desire to maximize joint or individual outcomes, their goals parallel those of integrative and distributive bargainers, respectively.
Like integrative bargainers, individuals with a prosocial orientation emphasize joint gain. Interdependence is characterized as an integrative relationship in which trust is high and the governing principle for resource distribution is equality (Deutsch, 1982; McClintock, 1988; Triandis, 1995) . Consistent with their emphasis on trust, prosocial individuals are highly concerned with the consequences of reciprocal cooperation or defection (Camac, 1992) . More generally, they show a greater concern for the well-being of others (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995) and characterize the behavior of others in terms of morality (Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1989) . Furthermore, in negotiations they adopt a softer bargaining style (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Olekalns, Smith, & Kibby, 1996) . Conversely, like distributive bargainers, proself individuals are concerned with personal outcomes. Under these circumstances, interdependence is represented as an exchange relationship characterized by limited trust and a concern for equity (Deutsch, 1982; McClintock, 1988; Triandis, 1995) . Reflecting this orientation, proselfs are known to be more concerned with information about their own outcomes (Grzelak, 1982) and the consequences of exploitation (also described as greed) (Camac, 1992) . They are less concerned with the well-being of others (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995) and interpret the behavior of others in terms of power (Liebrand et al., 1986; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1989) . As negotiators, they adopt a tougher bargaining style (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Olekalns et al., 1996) . Furthermore, when individuals are focused on personal goals, process is important only to the extent that it ensures desirable outcomes, whereas when individuals are focused on group goals, process is important in its own right because it increases group solidarity (see Lind & Tyler [1988] , who distinguish between self-interest and group-value models of procedural justice).
Because negotiations evolve over time, they do not offer clear and immediate links between strategy choices and outcomes. Instead, they provide considerable scope for influencing both the size and distribution of the resource pool. One implication is that although social value orientations are linked to allocational preferences, they also determine how individuals manage interactions leading to allocational decisions. In particular, negotiators will attempt to structure and transform the negotiating process so that they maximize the possibility of obtaining value-consistent outcomes (Kelley, 1997) .
This can be accomplished in two ways: At a global level, individuals can transform a negotiation by altering the frequency with which specific strategies are used, and at a local level, they can effect further outcome-specific transformations through the sequencing of strategies. Drawing on the research described above and Kelley's (1997) subsequent theoretical analysis, we focus on how the prosocial or proself orientations of individuals influence their selection and sequencing of strategies in a dyadic negotiation task.
At a global level, prosocial and proself negotiators will, through the selective use of negotiation strategies, transform the negotiation process into one that increases the likelihood of maximizing either joint or individual gain. Predictions about how such macrotransformations will be effected are relatively straightforward. Our earlier discussion linked the goals of prosocial individuals to those of an integrative bargaining style. We also suggested that such an orientation was associated with the differentiation of task and relational concerns. On this basis, we expect that prosocial negotiators will adopt an integrative bargaining style characterized by problem solving, priority information exchange, process management, and greater support for their opponents. Similarly, we linked the goals of proself individuals to those of distributive negotiators, further suggesting that because the pursuit of personal gain is linked to issues of dominance, task and relational concerns are not differentiated under this orientation. Consequently, we expect proself negotiators to adopt a distributive bargaining style characterized by positional information; contentiousness; and, to avert impasse, higher levels of concessionary behavior. We add only one qualification to these predictions, based on the argument that the exchange of both priority and positional information are task-focused strategies. McClintock (1988) argued that when faced with mixed-motive tasks, proself individuals are concerned to increase the resource pool (requiring priority information) and to obtain the greater share of that pool (requiring positional arguing). By extension, we propose that proself negotiators will employ both priority and positional information more frequently than prosocial negotiators.
So far, we have considered how social value orientations influence individuals' strategic choices. However, because negotiators do not act in isolation, we go on to consider how strategic choice is affected by dyadic composition. The simplest model, at the dyadic level, is an additive one in which dyadic composition further alters the frequency with which value-consistent strategies are used. Such a model is consistent with the argument that a substantial proportion of any interaction serves to establish individual preferences and has no consequences for outcomes (Kelley, 1997) . It is also consistent with the argument made by negotiation theorists that to successfully complete a negotiation, individuals must develop a shared understanding of their task (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994; Putnam & Holmer, 1992 ). Kelley's (1997) analysis, however, suggests that when interactions unfold over time, the sequencing of strategies plays an important role in shaping both those interactions and their outcomes. We consider how two functions for strategy sequences-situational transformation and diagnosis-will vary as a function of prosocial and proself orientations.
The sequential choices made by an interacting dyad provide another means for effecting situational transformations by progressively constraining or broadening the range of available choices (Kelley, 1997) . Increased flexibility and broader options, which can be achieved through the introduction of new topics (Kelley, 1997) , are typically associated with an integrative bargaining style (Putnam, 1990; Walton & McKersie, 1965) . Consequently, we expect prosocial dyads to be characterized by sequences in which process management strategies elicit additional information. In contrast, restricted flexibility and limited options, which may be the result of interpersonal challenges (Kelley, 1997) , are characteristic of a distributive bargaining style. This suggests that proself dyads will be characterized by sequences of argumentation or information (positional or priority) coupled with disagreement and rejection. We return to the issue of mixed dyads shortly.
A second, critical function for sequences is a diagnostic one. One of the problems faced by individuals is that at a global level, interpretation of a partner's goals and motives is difficult (Kelley, 1997) . Social value orientations, because they influence the expectations held of others (Kuhlman, Brown, & Tetac, 1992; Schlenker & Goldman, 1978) and increase sensitivity to valueconsistent information (De Dreu & Boles, 1997; Iedema & Poppe, 1994 , 1995 Schlenker & Goldman, 1978) , shape this interpretative process. This is especially pertinent in negotiations, in which certain tactics may contribute to either an integrative or a distributive strategy (Putnam, 1990; Putnam & Wilson, 1989; Roloff, Tutzauer, & Dailey, 1989; Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996; Wilson & Putnam, 1990) . Under these conditions, the patterning of negotiators' strategies provides an important means for testing opponents' goals and motives. This has two general consequences. The differential interpretation of such strategies as reflecting either power (proselfs) or morality (prosocials) may result in the selective elicitation or suppression of sequences of particular kinds on the basis of their value consistency. Alternatively, and in keeping with the diagnostic function served by sequences, pro-social and proself negotiators may differ in their responses to identical cues.
One further, specific consequence concerns strategic reciprocity, which will serve to establish the presence of shared goals. Recalling that proself negotiators are taskoriented, whereas prosocial negotiators are relationship-oriented, we expect to observe high levels of informational (positional and priority) reciprocity in pure proself dyads and high levels of relational (process management) reciprocity in pure prosocial dyads.
Finally, we turn to the issue of mixed dyads. We note that the sensitivity to value consistency is greater for prosocials, who are better able than proselfs to detect strategic differences (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a , 1970b Maki & McClintock, 1983 ) and who display a strategic shift to competition when interacting with proselfs (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a , 1970b Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988) . However, this phenomenon is situationally moderated. As the range of available strategies increases, both prosocials and proselfs shift away from value-consistent strategic choices and display behavioral convergence (Miller & Holmes, 1975; Schlenker & Goldman, 1978; Weingart & Brett, 1996) . This finding raises the question of whether mixed dyads will display behavioral assimilation or behavioral convergence. A prerequisite for behavioral assimilation is a well-structured and unambiguous set of strategic choices. If negotiators are able to attach unique meanings to the strategies of their opponents, the greater sensitivity of prosocial negotiators should result in a shift to competition. Under these conditions, mixed dyads would be expected to display strategic choices similar to those of pure proself dyads. But, if, as we have suggested, several strategies convey multiple meanings, then we would expect behavioral convergence: Both prosocial and proself negotiators should display shifts away from value-consistent strategic choices. Under these circumstances, we would expect to observe patterns of strategy selection and sequencing that differed from those of both kinds of pure dyad.
In summary, we have argued that because prosocial and proself negotiators differ in their understanding of the negotiating process, they will display different patterns of strategy choice and sequencing. On the basis of research in interdependent settings, several predictions may be made about how pure prosocial, pure proself, and mixed dyads will differ in their strategic choices. Because the negotiation context is considerably more ambiguous than that of other interdependent settings (such as prisoner's and social dilemmas), we further argued that these dyads might differ in how they sequence strategies. Given the tentative and exploratory nature of these propositions, we have identified several patterns of sequences that may emerge, without seeking preemptively to specify their exact nature.
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To investigate how members of negotiating dyads structure their interaction sequences and to determine whether the characteristics of such sequences reflect the composition of the dyads, we sought to represent the structural properties of these sequences statistically as a finite-state Markov chain. Markov chain analyses of dyadic interactions have been made by a number of investigators (e.g., England, 1973; Hawes & Foley, 1973; Thomas, 1985; Thomas, Roger, & Bull, 1983; Ting-Toomey, 1983; ; a formal derivation of the representation we used here appears in Olekalns and Smith (1997) . The Markov chain approach to the analysis of interaction sequences assumes that such sequences may be characterized in terms of their transition probabilities: These are the probabilities that a member of a dyad will use a particular tactic from the set of available tactics, given the tactic previously used by his or her opponent.
To characterize interaction sequences in this way, each utterance in an interaction sequence is represented as a random variable X n . The subscript n represents the time step at which the utterance occurred; the value of X n codes it as belonging to one of a finite set of tactic classes that are assumed to be available to each member of the dyad at each point in the sequence. A sequence of such random variables is said to possess the Markov property if
This equation states that the conditional probability that X n takes a particular value in a set of m tactic classes, given the values of all previous tactics used in the sequence, is equal to the conditional probability of X n , given the tactic used at the preceding time step only. A sequence that satisfies this property is also said to be a first-order Markov chain. Sequences for which the Markov property holds at the level of several preceding time steps rather than a single time step only are said to be higher order Markov chains. The analyses we report here are concerned primarily with chains of second order. When the probabilistic dependency between successive utterances expressed by the right-hand side of Equation 1 depends only on the properties of the utterance pair but not on the particular time at which they occur, the Markov chain is said to be homogeneous.
1 Such a chain may be characterized completely by specifying its initial state and an m × m matrix of transition probabilities T of the form
In this representation,
; that is, the rows i of T represent the classes of possible tactics at time n -1; the columns j represent the classes of possible tactics at time n, and the entry p ij is the probability that tactic j is used at time n, given that tactic i is used at the preceding time, n -1. As discussed by Agresti (1990) and Bishop, Fienberg, and Holland (1975) , such chains may be analyzed conveniently using widely available loglinear modeling techniques. Because the utterances in our data set were coded as both cues and responses, our analysis sought to characterize the probabilistic dependencies in sequences of alternating cues and responses of the form: C 1 , R 1 , C 2 , R 2 . . . C n , R n . Such sequences consist of transitions of two kinds: response selection transitions and cue selection transitions. Response selection transitions consist of pairs of elements of the form C i , R i , which describe the way in which an actor responds to his or her partner's previous cue during a given interaction cycle. Cue selection transitions consist of pairs of elements of the form R i -1 , C i , which describes the way in which an actor provides a cue for the next interaction cycle, following his or her own previous response. We assumed that response selection and cue selection were governed by separate Markov transition operators of the form from Equation 2, which we denote by T R and T C , respectively. Our analysis focused on sequence of elements of the following form:
In this notation, the superscripts in parentheses on the cues and responses denote the actor (a or b) emitting the cue or making the response; the pairs of superscripts on the transition operators similarly identify the actor or pair of actors involved. Because cueselection transitions represent a form of self-cueing, they involve a single actor only. As described by Olekalns and Smith (1997) , the log-linear approach to the analysis of Markov chains described by Agresti (1990) and Bishop et al. (1975) may be extended readily to the analysis of chains composed of alternating sequences of transition operators of this kind. The conditions required for a sequence of random variables to form a true homogeneous Markov chain are fairly restrictive, and any analysis of dyadic negotiations made in this way must be viewed as both an abstraction and an idealization, which ignores both the dynamic variation in tactic use that occurs over time and the idiosyncratic features that characterize the styles of individual dyads. Nevertheless, we believe that an analysis of this kind is useful for two reasons. First, it provides a way to describe regularities that underlie the frequency and the sequencing of tactic use across inter-
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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN action cycles. Second, it provides a way to link differences in these frequencies to structural characteristics of the dyads themselves. Both of these aspects of Markov chain analysis have the potential to provide us with information about the interplay of structural and process variables in dyadic negotiation that would be difficult or impossible to obtain by other means.
METHOD

Participants
Participants included 128 undergraduate psychology students at the University of Melbourne who took part in the negotiation of an employment contract. Participants were randomly allocated to a dyad and to a role within the dyad. Data were collected from dyads in separate sessions. To assess social value orientations, participants completed a set of nine decomposed games (Messick & McClintock, 1968) . In each game, participants were required to choose between three alternative pairs of outcomes, each representing one of the three social value orientations. For subjects to be classified as cooperative, competitive, or individualistic, they had to make six value-consistent choices. For the purposes of subsequent analysis, competitive and individualistic participants were classified as proself. On this basis, we were able to classify 45 dyads as purely prosocial (13), purely proself (15), or mixed (17). The remaining dyads contained at least one unclassifiable individual and were excluded from further analysis. Of the 45 dyads, 39 successfully completed the negotiation. Six negotiations ended in stalemate, with four stalemates occurring in mixed dyads and one in each of the pure dyads.
Procedure
Participants negotiated a simulated employment contract. Written instructions assigned the role of either an employer or employee, described the task, and provided a payoff schedule (shown in Table 1 ) and a contract for recording their final outcome. Negotiators were instructed to maximize the value of the contract for themselves. A lottery offering a small cash prize was used to provide an incentive; lottery tickets were allocated on the basis of contract value. No points were awarded for stalemates. Each negotiation was conducted face-to-face and was videotaped for subsequent analysis.
Posttask Questionnaire
At the end of the negotiation, participants completed a brief questionnaire. Using a 1 (not at all ) to 7 (highly) rating scale, subjects assessed their own and their partner's level of competition, cooperation, and satisfaction with the outcome, as well as the fairness of the outcome for both themselves and their partner.
Coding of Negotiations
The coding scheme described by Donohue, Diez, and Hamilton (1984) and subsequently adapted by Alexander, Schul, and Babakus (1991) was modified to distinguish between positional and priority information exchange. The revised classificatory scheme allows for the coding of each utterance as one of 12 responses (to Olekalns, Smith / ORIENTATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS 661 the other's preceding utterance) and as one of 13 cues (for the other's next utterance). Both cues and responses were subject to a factor analysis (see Olekalns et al. [1996] for a full description; see Table 2 for a summary of strategies used in subsequent analyses) to meet the requirements of the analysis described below. Two raters coded all transcripts and reliability was assessed using Cohen's κ. Bakeman and Gottman (1986) classify κ in the range 0.70 to 0.74 as very good and those at or above 0.75 as excellent. Cohen's κ was 0.74 for cues and 0.75 for responses. All discrepancies were resolved through discussion; analysis was based on the classifications agreed to during this resolution process.
RESULTS
To describe log-linear models of the Markov structure of interaction sequences, we use the notation of Fienberg (1980; see also Agresti, 1990; Iacobucci & Wasserman, 1988) , in which the structural properties of a loglinear model are expressed as sets of bracketed model terms. These have the property that a model contains all main effects of the terms in a bracketed set and all possible interactions between them. For example, consider a model that seeks to represent the probabilistic structure of the cue-response-cue sequence, C i -1, R i -1 , C i , in a three-way contingency table. The model [
is a pure main-effects model, in which the effects of C i -1 , R i -1 , and C i are mutually independent of one another. The absence of interactions is expressed in the Fienberg notation by the fact that each bracket contains a single model term only. The statistical test of this model may be regarded as an extension of the familiar chi-square test of independence for two-way contingency tables to a table of three dimensions. The model [
contains parameters for the main effects of C i -1 , R i -1 , and C i , but in addition, it contains parameters for the R i -1 × C i interaction, which is expressed in the Fienberg notation by the fact that R i -1 and C i are bracketed together. In this model, R i -1 and C i are dependent on one another but are mutually independent of C i -1 . As a final example, the model [C i -1 , R i -1 , C i ] is a saturated model, which contains main effects for C i -1 , R i -1 , and C i ; all two-way interactions C i -1 × R i -1 , R i -1 × C i , and C i -1 × C i ; and the single three-way interaction C i -1 × R i -1 × C i . This model expresses the mutual dependency of all three model terms.
A stationarity version of the Markov model may be analyzed using a log-linear model of the form [
The second-order Markov property is expressed in this model by the absence of the four-way interaction term C i -1 × R i -1 × C i × R i . In the analyses we report here, we also assume that the actors in a dyad are stochastically equivalent (Wasserman & Weaver, 1985) . This means that the parameters governing tactic selection are assumed to be the same for both members of a dyad.
Because our analysis is concerned not only with the statistical structure of interaction sequences but also with the relationship between this structure and dyad type, we introduce an additional model term D, which represents dyad type. The simplest second-order Markov model of this kind is the model [
, in which the transition structure of the interaction sequences is independent of dyad type. More complex models permit dependencies between various properties of the interaction and dyad type. The models we have considered allow cue probabilities, response probabilities, and first-order cue selection and response selection transitions to depend on dyad type. For example, the model [ 
has first-order response selection transitions dependent on dyad type; the model [
has both firstorder response selection and cue selection transitions dependent on dyad type. As discussed subsequently, these models appear to possess sufficient structural richness to represent the major features of our data. The model fits reported here were performed in Generalized Linear Models (GLIM). As described by Agresti (1990, Appendix A) and Wasserman and Iacobucci (1985) , log-linear models may be fitted in GLIM using a Poisson error distribution and a logarithmic function. GLIM reports a goodness-of-fit statistic called Deviance, which, for log-linear models, is equal to the likelihood ratio goodness-of-fit statistic, G 2 . When the total number of observations is large relative to the number of cells in the table, G 2 for a true model is distributed as chi-square, with degrees of freedom equal to the degrees of freedom for the table minus the number of estimated parameters. In our model fits, we considered only sequences of the form of Expression 3 (see above) that contained no unclassifiable cues or responses. This reduced our original corpus of around 8,000 utterances to 3,000 classifiable sequences of length four. Although the unclassifiable utterances arguably may be interesting in their own right, their role in advancing the negotiation is unclear, so we have chosen to exclude them from the present analysis.
The model fits were performed on a table of size m 4 × d, where m = 4 is the number of cue and response categories and d = 3 is the number of dyad types. This yielded a five-dimensional contingency table with 768 cells. As discussed by Agresti (1990, pp. 246-250) , G 2 statistics computed on sparse contingency tables of this kind are likely to approximate chi-square rather poorly. Specifically, when the average expected frequency is between 1 and 4, as it is here, G 2 tends to provide too liberal a test, with reported p values tending to underestimate the true values. This may result in an overfitting bias because the p values obtained from a sequence of model fits may favor a model that is more complex than required. A partial remedy to this problem is to consider conditional likelihood ratio tests of particular model terms. These are tests of the form
. In this notation, M 1 and M 2 are models that form a nested class, such that M 1 differs from M 2 by the inclusion of additional model terms. The conditional test is a test of whether these additional terms are zero. Asymptotically, conditional G 2 is distributed as chi-square, with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the degrees of freedom for M 2 and M 1 . Because it is based on selected margins of the contingency table rather than on the table as a whole, the approximation to chi-square will usually be better for conditional tests than for tests of overall fit. For this reason, we report both kinds of test here. Table 3 reports model fits for a variety of second-order Markov models, in which the dependency between strategy use and dyad type varies. Because of the sparseness of the contingency table, it is not possible to consider effects beyond second order. As can be seen from the G 2 values shown in Table 3 , a second-order model in which dyad type and strategy use are independent fails to fit the data. However, an acceptable level of fit is obtained from the simplest dependency model, in which the frequency of cue use is related to dyad type (G 2 = 568.0, p = .798). Progressive model fits were obtained with the addition of terms reflecting a dependency between (a) dyad type and the frequency of response use and (b) dyad type and first order response-selection transitions. No further improvements in fit were obtained with the addition of a Olekalns, Smith / ORIENTATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS 663 
540.9 585 a 0.904 18.90 term reflecting a dependency between dyad type and first-order cue selection transitions.
To examine these effects in detail, we calculated standardized residuals for fits of the dyad-type-independent, second-order Markov model,
. The standardized residual for any cell j is equal to (n j -m j )/m j 1/2 , where n j and m j are, respectively, the observed frequency and fitted values for the cell. Cells with large standardized residuals make large contributions to the overall model chi-square and thus are of special importance in diagnosing the cause of a model's failure to fit (Agresti, 1990) . However, smaller residuals may also contribute to our understanding of underlying processes, so we also give some consideration to cells with moderate standardized residuals. Table 4 shows both observed frequencies and standardized residuals for cue-response sequences, classified according to dyad type.
The results show that dyads, classified according to social value orientations, differ in the frequency with which specific cues and responses are used. We observed considerably more variation, across dyads, in the use of cues than in the use of responses. As can be seen in Figure  1 , a unique pattern of strategy use characterizes each dyad type. Consistent with our expectations, we observed a greater than expected use of restructuring cues and other support responses in prosocial dyads and a greater than expected use of concessions in proself dyads. However, contrary to our expectations, proself dyads also used restructuring cues, priority cues, and priority responses more frequently, and positional cues less frequently, than expected. Mixed dyads displayed a distinctive pattern of behavior, using restructuring cues, priority cues, and priority responses less frequently than expected (contrasting with prosocial and proself dyads) and positional cues more frequently than expected (contrasting with proself dyads).
Our analysis also showed that dyadic composition influenced the use of cue-response sequences, although these effects were less pronounced than the simple frequency effects. As can be seen in Figure 2 , two patterns emerged. All three dyad types were characterized by the more frequent than expected use of restructuring cueinitiated sequences; they varied in their responses to this cue. Our findings suggest that prosocial dyads responded to restructuring cues in a way that narrowed subsequent options (restructure-reject), whereas proself dyads responded in a way that broadened subsequent options (restructure-other support). Interestingly, in this context, mixed dyads displayed somewhat more task-focused behavior by responding to restructuring cues with additional priority information. A second difference in the sequencing of cues and responses shows that positional information-priority information sequences are used more frequently than expected by 664 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN proself dyads and less frequently than expected by mixed dyads.
Supplementary Analyses
Neither individual or dyadic social value orientations predicted negotiated outcomes. However, a nonsignificant trend suggested that pure dyads obtained higher joint outcomes (10, 644) than mixed dyads (8, 233) across the four integrative issues, F(1, 39) = 3.24, p = .08. Perceived levels of own or others' competitiveness, cooperation, satisfaction with, and fairness of outcomes were not affected by social value orientations. Because of our interest in shared frames, we also calculated the absolute difference between negotiators' self-assessment and their partners' assessment of their competition and cooperation. A 2 factor (own social value orientation [SVO] × partner's SVO) ANOVA of this discrepancy score showed that both pure proself and prosocial dyads were more accurate in their perceptions of a partner's competitiveness than were mixed dyads, F(1, 76) = 4.69, p < .05. A similar, nonsignificant trend was observed for cooperation, F(1, 76) = 3.74, p = .057. Means for both effects are shown in Table 5 .
DISCUSSION
Drawing on Kelley's (1997) theory, we proposed that the frequency with which negotiators use specific strategies provides a tool for transforming the negotiation process. Although we observed systematic social value orientation-related differences in the frequency with which cues and, to a lesser extent, responses were selected, not all of our findings reflected valueconsistent behaviors. Consistent with our distinction between the task and relational components of negotiations, prosocial dyads more frequently selected strategies that were relationship-focused (restructuring, other-support), proself dyads selected a mixture of relationship-(restructuring) and task-focused (priority information, concessions) strategies, and mixed dyads more frequently selected one strategy (positional information) that was task-focused. In addition, mixed dyads displayed a pattern of strategy use that was more consistent with behavioral convergence than with behavioral assimilation: Strategies that characterized pure dyads occurred less frequently in mixed dyads.
We argued that strategic sequences serve two functions: (a) by marking critical transition points in an interaction, they transform the negotiating process and (b) by providing information about how ambiguous strategies are interpreted, they help determine opponents' goals and motives. Our analysis suggests that restructuring cue-initiated sequences plays a pivotal role in negotiations, simultaneously serving both functions. Consistent with our argument about the informational role of sequences, dyadic composition affected how negotiators responded to restructuring cues. Also consistent with our argument, these responses had the effect of either constraining or broadening options. Unexpectedly, however, restructuring cue-initiated sequences appeared to limit the options of prosocial dyads while expanding those of proself and mixed dyads. Finally, although we obtained indirect evidence for the existence of shared frames from the finding that prosocial and proself dyads have less discrepant perceptions of their own and their partners' behavior than do mixed dyads, we found no evidence that pure dyads used strategic reciprocity for this purpose.
Returning again to Kelley's (1997) framework, these findings suggest that simple frequency effects are a sufficient mechanism for transforming an interaction and establishing the existence of a shared perspective. It leads us to speculate that the principal role for strategic sequences is neither transformational nor diagnostic in a broad sense. Instead, at least in a negotiation context, Olekalns, Smith / ORIENTATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS 665 social value orientation-related differences in the sequencing of strategies appear more tightly bound to microprocesses of goal management. Viewed in this light, the specific patterns of strategies and sequences sheds light on the distinctive negotiating styles of each dyad type. As we expected, pure prosocial dyads placed emphasis on the relational component of negotiations.
Under such circumstances, negotiators face the risk of premature closure, and restructuring-rejection sequences may well provide a means for prolonging negotiations. By comparison, pure proself dyads behaved in a highly strategic manner. Although their use of priority information outweighed their use of positional information, we observed the frequent use of positional-priority sequences. Similarly, although these dyads showed little other support, this strategy was frequently incorporated into restructure-other support sequences. We propose that this reflects a complex accommodative strategy on the part of proself dyads. First, the asymmetric exchange of information is more consistent with an intention to influence others' behavior than with an intention to maximize joint gain (Kelley, 1997; Olekalns & Smith, 1998) . Second, the combination of restructuring with other support suggests that attention is given to relationship issues primarily as a means for preventing escalating conflict and, possibly, impasse. Finally, consistent with their overall poorer outcomes, mixed dyads adopted a classically distributive bargaining style in which the principal aim was selfprotection. Support for this argument derives from their infrequent use of positional-priority sequences, a type of information mismatch that may enable exploitation Weingart, Prietula, Hyder, & Genovese, 1995; Wilson & Putnam, 1990) . There are several limitations to this study that should be noted, each of which identifies an avenue for further research. First, at the outset, negotiators were instructed to maximize their own gain and, as a consequence, all dyads adopted a highly contentious style of bargaining. Our observations provide insight into the relationship between social value orientations, strategy choice, and sequencing in a competitive context that may have advantaged proself negotiators. To better understand the nature of this relationship, it would be useful to examine these same relationships within a more collaborative context. Second, we generalized from the mightmorality literature to provide a basis for our argument that differences in strategy selection reflected differences in the representation of the negotiating relationship. Capturing these representations and linking them to strategic choice would provide further support for this view. Third, we considered the negotiation process independent of its outcome. Although this limitation was imposed on us by the size of our data set, we recognize the importance of determining whether the valuerelated differences in strategic choices that we observed reflect differences in negotiated outcomes or whether they reflect different paths to similar outcomes. However, the trend for pure dyads to obtain higher joint outcomes-when considered in light of recent research (Olekalns & Smith, 1998 )-supports the second of these suggestions and identifies a further avenue for research.
Finally, we highlight the strengths of this study. Through an analysis of the statistical structure of interaction sequences, we have successfully linked differences in the social value orientations of negotiating dyads to differences in the use and sequencing of negotiation strategies. In doing so, we have provided evidence of the greater importance of socioemotional aspects of the negotiating relationship to prosocial dyads and the greater importance of task aspects of the negotiating relationship to proself and mixed dyads. Furthermore, our results suggest that the frequency with which dyads use negotiation strategies assists them to transform the negotiating process and to establish the existence of a shared perspective. Within this context, strategic sequences provide an important tool for managing the dyad-specific obstacles to goal attainment. Overall, our findings address a relatively neglected area in negotiation theory, that of individual differences, and further demonstrate the role of one dispositional variable in influencing the negotiation process. NOTE 1. Maximum-likelihood estimation of the parameters of a finitestate Markov chain using log-linear modeling techniques typically requires not only homogeneity but also the stronger assumption of stationarity. In general, a homogeneous Markov chain will possess an equilibrium distribution that represents the steady-state or long-run characteristics of the system. Formally, P[X n ] = P [X n + 1 ] = P [X n + 2 ] = . . . . A Markov chain that has attained this equilibrium value is said to be stationary. As discussed by Agresti (1990) and Olekalns and Smith (1997, appendix) , the assumption of stationarity allows one to pool successive utterance sequences of a given, fixed length from within a longer interaction sequence to form a contingency table. Such pooling is required to produce a table that is small enough to analyze using available statistical software and to ensure that maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the table are consistent.
